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INTRODUCTION
In response to its finding that approximately forty-three million
Americans have one or more mental or physical disabilities, Congress
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1
Congress’s purposes in enacting the ADA were “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities”2 and to “bring
persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life.”3 To those ends, the protections Congress afforded to
the disabled under the ADA extend to numerous aspects of public
life, including employment,4 public services such as transportation,5
and public accommodations.6
Title III of the ADA, the subchapter addressing public
accommodations, sets forth a general prohibition on discrimination:
“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
Copyright © 2000 by Matthew A. Stowe.
1. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213, § 12101(a)(1) (1994)) (finding that currently forty-three million Americans have one or
more disabilities and “this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older”).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304. The
genesis of this seminal legislation was the recognition that, despite the extraordinary efforts of
advocates for the disabled, many disabled Americans lived their lives in intolerable isolation
and dependence. See id. at 32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 303, 313.
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
5. See id. §§ 12131-12165.
6. See id. §§ 12181-12189.
STOWE 10/17/00  1:29 PM
298 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:297
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.”7 Although the language
of Title III defines place of “public accommodation”8 and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has supplemented and clarified that
definition in applicable regulations,9 courts have expressed substantial
disagreement about its meaning.10 The principal point of contention is
whether the term “place of public accommodation” is narrowly
limited to physical places or whether it encompasses something
more.11 Because Title III prohibits discrimination in places of public
accommodation, a narrow construction of this term limits the
applicability of Title III and raises the question of whether such a
narrow construction comports with the express purposes of the
ADA.12
7. Id. § 12182(a).
8. Id. § 12181(7).
9. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999). The Attorney General has authority to promulgate
regulations under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
10. Compare Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that “places of public accommodation” are limited to physical places), with Carparts
Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
“establishments of public accommodation” are not limited to physical structures).
11. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing a
circuit split concerning whether “place of public accommodation” is limited to physical
structures).
12. Though the judicial resolution of the meaning of “place of public accommodation”
under Title III may appear to be a relatively minor determination, it has decidedly important
implications for the disabled community and may even more broadly impact civil rights
protections of other minority groups. To illustrate the practicality of this judicial determination,
consider the applicability of Title III’s nondiscrimination provision to insurance policies.
Insurance offices are specifically designated as places of public accommodation in the text of
Title III, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), and it thus violates Title III to discriminate against a
disabled individual “in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods [and] services” of an insurance
office. Courts construing “place of public accommodation” narrowly have held that because
employer-sponsored insurance policies are acquired at an individual’s workplace rather than an
insurance office, Title III does not apply to such policies. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13; Parker,
121 F.3d at 1010. Other courts have held that a broader interpretation of “place of public
accommodation” is required, noting that it would be “irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an [insurance] office to purchase services are protected by the ADA,” while those who
obtain their policy through an employer, by mail, or by the Internet are not protected. Carparts,
37 F.3d at 19; accord Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299, 301-02 (N.D. Cal.
1997). In adopting this broader interpretation, courts have signaled that Title III guarantees the
disabled more than mere access to physical structures. See, e.g., Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the plain meaning of the statute
demonstrates that Title III is not restricted to proscribing only the denial of physical access to
disabled persons).
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In Part I, this Note sets forth and briefly discusses the text of
Title III, focusing on the statute’s definition of “place of public
accommodation.” Part II extensively examines insurance-related
cases interpreting “place of public accommodation” under Title III.
Because most litigation regarding the meaning of “place of public
accommodation” has arisen in the insurance context, it is unsurprising
that most commentators have analyzed the meaning of the term in the
context of Title III’s applicability to insurance policies.13 However, the
debate over the meaning of Title III does not stop there, and if, as
some suggest, insurance policies require special treatment under Title
III,14 the interpretation of “place of public accommodation” in other
contexts should be further examined.15 Indeed, Section II.D
demonstrates that, although the insurance cases provide valuable
analysis, a normative definition of “place of public accommodation”
is better informed by examining cases beyond those involving
insurance claims. Accordingly, Part III examines a line of cases
determining whether membership organizations are “places of public
accommodation” and thus subject to Title III’s discrimination
prohibition. Part IV uses a hypothetical example to argue that “place
of public accommodation” under Title III should be interpreted
broadly. It argues not only that “places of public accommodation” are
not limited to physical places but also that the term should be
interpreted to include membership organizations with no ties to
physical facilities. Part V recognizes that this argument is in tension
13. See, e.g., Jill L. Schultz, Note, The Impact of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act on Employer-Provided Insurance Plans: Is the Insurance Company Subject to Liability?, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 343 passim (1999) (examining whether Title III provides disabled
Americans with a cause of action against insurance companies because of discriminatory
employer-provided insurance plans); Karen M. Volkman, Comment, The Limits of Coverage:
Do Insurance Policies Obtained Through an Employer and Administered by Insurance
Companies Fall Within the Scope of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 43 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 249 passim (1999) (suggesting that the policy underlying the ADA calls for a
broad interpretation of the statute so as to encompass employer-provided insurance policies).
14. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 380 (arguing that a DOJ publication specifically
addressing insurance policies under the ADA should be relied upon in insurance cases rather
than the DOJ regulations that ordinarily apply to Title III).
15. Other determinations that have directly turned on whether places of public
accommodation are limited to physical structures include, for example, whether a child with
attention deficit disorder could be excluded from a youth hockey league, see Elitt v. U.S.A.
Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 218 (E.D. Mo. 1996), whether a youth baseball league could disallow
a disabled a child with cerebral palsy to “play-down” in a lower age bracket, see Shultz v. Hemet
Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and whether NFL television
“blackout” rules impermissibly deny deaf persons access to live broadcasts of football games,
see Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1995).
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with analogous jurisprudence interpreting “place of public
accommodation” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) but
proposes means of reconciling this Note’s interpretation of “place of
public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA with existing
analogous CRA case law.
I.  THE LANGUAGE OF TITLE III: TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY
Laden with ambiguous new legal terms,16 the ADA has become a
rich source of litigation in its short history. Rather than elucidating
the meaning of Title III of the ADA, court decisions and agency
regulations have heaped ambiguity upon ambiguity through
inconsistent use of Title III’s terms.17 Any effort to resolve intelligibly
the ambiguity in Title III must begin by analyzing its text.18
Section 302(a) of the ADA states that “[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”19 Although the statute does not technically define
“place of public accommodation,” it provides a list of private entities
that are considered “public accommodations” when their operations
affect commerce.20 In actuality, however, when the statute defines
“public accommodation,” it is in fact defining “place of public
accommodation”; a “public accommodation” is the entity that
operates, owns, or leases the place of public accommodation.21 Failure
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 59-60 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 267,
298 (identifying the House of Representatives’ concern that the bill contains vague and
confusing new legal terms, causing its interpretation to be conducted mainly by the judiciary
rather than Congress).
17. See infra notes 30-114 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 526
U.S. 434, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our precedents make clear that an analysis of
any statute . . . must not begin with external sources, but with the text itself.”); New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)
(stating “we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the
provision in question”).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
20. See id. § 12181(7).
21. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B., at 622 (1999). At this point, it is appropriate to clarify the
ambiguity in terms in order to establish a vocabulary for discussion. While section 302(a) of the
ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in places of public accommodation, see 42
U.S.C. § 12182(a), the statute defines only “public accommodation” but not “place of public
accommodation.” See id. § 12181(7). Substituting the statute’s definitional examples of “public
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to differentiate between these two terms has contributed to the
confusion in the law’s interpretation.
Because the central inquiry of this Note is whether places of
public accommodation are limited to actual physical structures, it is
important to examine the examples of places of public
accommodation provided in the statute.22 The examples of places of
accommodations” (e.g., theaters, libraries, places of recreation) into the text of section 302(a)
yields nonsensical results. Under such a technical application of the statute’s definition of
“public accommodation,” section 302(a) would prohibit discrimination against the disabled in
“any place of a theater” or “any place of a place of recreation.” Further obfuscating the
meaning of Title III is the fact that courts have used the terms “place of public accommodation”
and “public accommodation” interchangeably. See, e.g., Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-33 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating both that “the clear connotation of the
words in § 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical place” and that “[t]he
establishments enumerated in § 12181(7) clearly show that a ‘place of public accommodation’ is
a physical place”) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to its authority under the ADA, the DOJ has promulgated regulations to
implement the provisions of Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994). In its regulations, the
DOJ attempts to resolve the ambiguity deriving from the text of Title III by clearly
distinguishing “place of public accommodation” from “public accommodation.” See 28 C.F.R.
pt. 36, app. B, at 622 (1999) (defining both “place of public accommodation” and “public
accommodation”). Indeed, the regulations indicate that when Congress defined “public
accommodation” in section 301(7) of the ADA, it was in actuality defining “place of public
accommodation.” See id. (“The term ‘place of public accommodation’ is an adaptation of the
statutory definition of ‘public accommodation’ in section 301(7) of the ADA . . . .”). The term
“public accommodation,” on the other hand, refers to “the private entity that owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Id. By drawing this distinction, the
DOJ is able to conclude that the discrimination prohibition of section 302(a) applies to public
accommodations in the context of their ownership, leasing, or operation of places of public
accommodation. See id. This resolves the aforementioned textual absurdity associated with a
technical reading of Title III; the substitution of the DOJ’s language into section 302(a) results
in a prohibition of discrimination against the disabled in the “full and equal enjoyment of the
goods [and] services . . . of any place of public accommodation by a public accommodation.” See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). This not only avoids the nonsensical prohibition of discrimination
in, for example, “any place of a place of recreation,” but it develops an operative vocabulary for
a clearer discussion of the scope of Title III.
22. The full definition of “public accommodation” reads:
The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes of
this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce—
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and
that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of
such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition
or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other
sales or rental establishment;
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public accommodation listed in the statute are divided into twelve
groups.23 For example, one category of entities that may be places of
public accommodation includes “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling
alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.”24 Those
examples are clearly physical places. In fact, most of the examples in
the definitional list, and arguably all, are actual physical places. Some
examples, however, such as “travel service,” are arguably not physical
places; such arguments are explored in Part II of this Note.
In addition to the definitional list provided in the text of the
statute, applicable DOJ regulations define places of public
accommodation as “facilities,”25 which, under a plain and ordinary
reading, are physical structures.26 Because the DOJ has authority to
promulgate regulations to implement the ADA,27 and because courts
defer to agency regulations that are not arbitrary or contrary to the
statute,28 the inquiry into whether places of public accommodation are
limited to physical structures ought to be relatively brief. However, an
abundance of judicial decisions disagreeing about whether places of
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school,
or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or
recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
23. See id.
24. Id. § 12181(7)(L).
25. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 622.
26. See Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp. 496, 498 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (“‘[F]acility’ . . . appears clearly to be defined as a physical structure.”) (quotations
omitted). Furthermore, the regulations define “facility” as “all or any portion of buildings,
structures, sites, complexes, equipment . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994) (declaring that “the Attorney General shall issue
regulations in an accessible format to carry out the provisions of this subchapter not referred to
in [section 12186(a)]”).
28. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (stating that agency interpretations are given controlling weight by courts if they are
reasonable and not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
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public accommodation are limited to actual physical structures
suggests otherwise.29
An analysis of existing case law is warranted to help determine
not only whether places of public accommodation under Title III are
limited to actual physical places but also to determine whether they
should be. Moreover, in light of the DOJ regulations defining “place
of public accommodation” as a “facility,” cases holding that “places
of public accommodation” do not have to be physical places should
be examined to determine whether they fail to consider the
regulations, consciously disregard the regulations as contrary to the
statute, or accept the regulations with alternative reasoning for their
holding. Further, a finding that places of public accommodation
should not be limited to physical structures invites an analysis of
which non-physical entities could constitute places of public
accommodation.
II.  INSURANCE CASES: THE EPICENTER OF DEBATE
Although Title III safeguards the right of disabled citizens to be
free from discriminatory treatment in a broad variety of contexts,
nowhere have complaints about violations of Title III’s discrimination
prohibitions arisen more frequently than in the insurance context.
Cases addressing the applicability of Title III to insurance policies are
numerous, dealing chiefly with a small set of issues: whether policy
provisions limiting benefits for AIDS-related illnesses are
discriminatory under Title III;30 whether it violates Title III for a long-
term disability insurance policy to provide disparate levels of
coverage for mental, as opposed to physical, disabilities absent
actuarial support for such a distinction;31 whether refusal to insure an
29. See infra notes 30-114 and accompanying text.
30. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing a
claim against an insurer that limited benefits for AIDS-related conditions to $25,000 or
$100,000, while benefits for other conditions were limited to $1 million); Carparts Distribution
Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing a dismissal
of a claim against an insurer whose plan limited benefits for AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000);
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1203 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that a policy cap
limiting lifetime benefits for AIDS treatment to $5,000 violated Title III).
31. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1998) (addressing a
plan that extended coverage for physical disabilities until age 65, yet extended coverage for
mental disabilities for a maximum of two years); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Conners v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D. Me.
1999) (same); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (same); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same).
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individual based on disability, often in the absence of sound actuarial
data to support such a refusal, violates Title III;32 and whether it
violates Title III to charge a disabled person a higher rate for life
insurance without actuarial data supporting the higher rate.33
Although the facts of these inquiries vary, the core question involved
in each of them is whether Title III’s nondiscrimination provision
reaches the content of insurance policies.34
In answering this question, courts have first examined the
threshold question of whether discrimination in the terms of an
insurance policy is included in the penumbra of discriminatory
practices that Congress sought to proscribe in Title III. Looking to
the text of Title III, Congress’s explicit intent was to prohibit
disability-based discrimination in the access to “goods, services,
facilities . . . of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”35 Accordingly, several judicial inquiries have
focused on whether employer-sponsored insurance policies constitute
“goods” or “services” of a “place of public accommodation.” In
making this determination, courts have had first to decide whether
“places of public accommodation” are limited to physical facilities,
such as insurance office buildings, or whether they include non-
32. See Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565-66 (D. Minn. 1998)
(addressing whether a denial of long-term disability insurance to an applicant diagnosed with a
mental illness violated Title III); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204, 209
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (examining whether an insurer’s refusal to issue a joint life insurance policy to
an applicant suffering from major depression violated Title III); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (deciding whether denial of life insurance to an applicant
based on the applicant’s partner’s HIV status violated Title III); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 429 (D.N.H. 1996) (addressing whether the denial of an application
for mortgage disability insurance based on the applicant’s past diagnosis of bipolar disorder
violates Title III); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(examining whether an insurer’s denial of life insurance policy based on the applicant’s spouse’s
HIV-positive status violates Title III); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL
573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (deciding whether the denial of health insurance coverage
to an eleven-year-old with a history of seizures violated Title III); Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp.
Ass’n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (adjudicating the question of whether the denial
of family health insurance to applicant violated Title III when the husband of the applicant had
received treatment for hypertension and hyperlipidemia and her son was a paraplegic).
33. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190-92 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (addressing whether a life insurer’s charge of a higher rate for a policy to an applicant
suffering from fascioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy violated Title III).
34. Often the question is more narrowly focused on whether Title III reaches the content
of employer-sponsored insurance policies. See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008 (examining
whether Title III governs the content of an employer-sponsored long-term disability plan).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
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physical places like websites, telephone lines, or any other medium
through which insurance policies may be transferred. This question
has resulted in a circuit split and vigorous judicial debate.
A. Decisions Broadly Construing “Place of Public Accommodation”
In 1994, the First Circuit Court of Appeals was among the first to
address whether “places of public accommodation” are limited to
actual physical places in Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v.
Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n.36 The plaintiff in Carparts had been a
participant in a medical reimbursement plan offered by the
Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England (AWANE)
since 1977.37 In 1986, the plaintiff was diagnosed as HIV-positive and
was subsequently diagnosed with AIDS in 1991.38 During this time,
the plaintiff submitted reimbursement claims to AWANE for
required medical treatment and medications.39 With knowledge of the
plaintiff’s illness, AWANE amended its medical reimbursement plan
(effective January 1991) to cap benefits for AIDS-related illnesses at
$25,000.40 For any illness not AIDS-related, however, medical
reimbursement benefits were capped at $1 million for each plan
member.41 The plaintiff sued AWANE, claiming that the amendment
to the plan violated anti-discriminations laws including Title III of the
ADA.42
The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire denied the plaintiff’s Title III claim, stating that the
defendants, including AWANE, “simply do not qualify as ‘places of
public accommodation.’”43 The court explained that it “interprets this
definition of public accommodation as being limited to actual physical
structures with definite physical boundaries which a person physically
enters for the purpose of utilizing the facilities or obtaining services
therein.”44 Because neither AWANE nor the AWANE medical
36. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
37. See id. at 14.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 826 F. Supp. 583, 586
(D.N.H. 1993), rev’d, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
44. Id.
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reimbursement plan possessed these characteristics, the district court
denied the plaintiff’s Title III claim.45
Although the court of appeals in Carparts stopped short of
determining whether Title III actually governs the content of
insurance plans,46 it stated with certainty that the district court erred
in its narrow interpretation of “place of public accommodation.”47
Examining the language of Title III, the court began its analysis by
noting that nothing in the plain language of section 301(7) of the
ADA requires a public accommodation to have physical structures
that persons can enter.48 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
inclusion of such entities as “travel services” and “service
establishments” in the list of public accommodations in section 301(7)
manifested Congress’s intent to include entities that do not require
persons to enter physical structures to receive services.49 Because
many “travel services,” for example, conduct their business by
telephone or mail, customers need not enter any physical structures
to obtain the goods or services of a “travel service.”50 The court thus
concluded that it would be irrational if customers who entered an
office of a travel service were protected by the ADA’s
nondiscrimination provision while those who purchased the exact
same services by mail or telephone were not: “Congress could not
have intended such an absurd result.”51
The Carparts court completed its holding that places of public
accommodation are not limited to actual physical places by examining
the purposes and legislative history of the ADA. The purposes of the
ADA, as stated in the text of the statute itself, are to “address the
45. See id.
46. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20 (stating that because of possible interpretations of other
sections of the ADA, “it is unwise to go beyond the possibility that the plaintiff may be able to
develop some kind of claim under Title III”). Because determining whether Title III reaches the
content of insurance policies requires a more extended analysis of multiple sources, this Note
also stops short of that determination.
47. See id. at 18-19.
48. See id. at 19 (asserting that even if the plain meaning of “public accommodation” were
not clear from the text, the term ought not to be limited to physical structures in light of
applicable agency regulations and policy concerns).
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Id. Another example of such an irrational result was provided in Lewis v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997). There, the court noted that “a department store
which could not refuse to sell shoes to disabled customers who visited the store’s downtown
business location could freely refuse services to disabled customers who ordered from the
store’s catalog.” Id. at 1165.
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major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities”52 and to “provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities.”53 Furthermore, Congress’s oft-quoted purpose in drafting
Title III was “to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American life . . . in a clear, balanced, and
reasonable manner.”54 With this in mind, the court concluded that
limiting the applicability of Title III to physical structures that people
must enter to obtain goods or services would contravene the remedial
purposes of the ADA and frustrate Congress’s intent that disabled
individuals fully and equally enjoy the “goods, services, privileges and
advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the
general public.”55
Numerous district courts have adopted Carparts’s interpretation
of “place of public accommodation” and have even gone further than
Carparts in holding that Title III governs the content of insurance
policies.56 These courts have allied themselves with the First Circuit in
finding that nothing in the plain language of Title III limits it merely
to guaranteeing nondiscrimination in access to physical structures.57
Notably, in a recent decision authored by Chief Judge Posner, the
Seventh Circuit adopted Carparts’s broader construction of “place of
public accommodation,” noting that places of public accommodation
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
53. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994)).
54. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 382).
55. Id. at 20.
56. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
(stating that the reasoning of Carparts and other courts “suffice[s] to persuade this Court of the
applicability of Title III to Prudential’s denial of plaintiff’s application”); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding that Title III
“would extend to the substance or contents of an insurance policy where, as here, the plaintiff
has been denied access to insurance because of his or her disability”); Baker v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., No. 94 C 4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (holding that Title III
applies when a plaintiff is not physically present at the place of public accommodation but has
contact with an insurer through his father by correspondence and telephone). But see Doe v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559-61 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopting Carparts’s broader
reading of “place of public accommodation” in a remarkably similar case, but holding that Title
III does not govern the content of insurance policies).
57. See, e.g., Conners v. Maine Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D. Me. 1999) (“[U]nder
the plain language of Title III, the Act would extend to the substance or contents of an
insurance policy.”); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(“Title III’s plain language does not refer to access to physical structures . . . . [and] does not bar
only discrimination in access to physical structures.”).
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include entities “whether in physical space or in electronic space.”58
Furthermore, many courts have echoed and augmented the First
Circuit’s analysis of the purpose, legislative history, and policies
underlying the ADA, strengthening the policy arguments in favor of a
broad reading of “place of public accommodation.” One district court
has commented, for example, that because access to adequate
healthcare is “integral to a disabled individual’s ability to participate
in society,” arbitrary discrimination in the terms of an insurance
policy runs afoul of the stated purpose of the ADA.59
Additionally, district courts have furnished arguments in favor of
a broad reading of “place of public accommodation” that are not
discussed in the First Circuit analysis. In Winslow v. IDS Life
Insurance Co.,60 for example, the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota noted that limiting places of public
accommodation to physical structures virtually negates the
protections that the ADA provides for the mentally disabled.61 If one
accepts a narrow reading, the court explained, one would have to
accept that Title III’s protection of the mentally disabled from
discrimination is limited to the circumstance in which a mentally
disabled person is denied access to a physical structure.62 Another
court propounded a similar rationale for a broad reading of “place of
public accommodation”; under the ADA, “disabled” persons include
not only those with mental and physical impairments but also those
regarded as having such impairments and those who have a record of
such impairments.63 If Title III’s nondiscrimination provision
guarantees only physical access to places, “then many persons who do
not suffer from a physical handicap but are explicitly protected by
Title III could bring a Title III claim only if the public
accommodation took affirmative steps to block such persons’ physical
58. Chief Judge Posner stated:
The core meaning of [section 302(a) of the ADA], plainly enough, is that the owner
or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web
site, or other facility (whether in physical space or in electronic space) that is open to
the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in,
from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.
Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d at 559 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19).
59. World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
60. 29 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D. Minn. 1998).
61. See id. at 562.
62. See id.
63. See Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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access.”64 The court could not accept that Congress would have
intended such an “anomalous result.”65
Likewise, numerous courts have supported a broad reading of
“place of public accommodation” by referring to Title III’s definition
of discrimination in section 302(b)(2)(A).66 For the purposes of Title
III’s general prohibition of discrimination, the statute provides that
discrimination includes, inter alia, the “imposition or application of
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual
with a disability” from full enjoyment of goods, services, facilities,
etc.,67 and “failure to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to
afford such goods [and] services . . . to individuals with disabilities.”68
In light of these examples of discriminatory conduct under Title III,
some courts have found that limiting “places of public
accommodation” to physical places would render such language from
the ADA superfluous69 or irrelevant.70
Thus, beginning with the Carparts decision, courts have relied on
the plain language of Title III, applicable DOJ regulations,71 the
64. Id. at 1322.
65. Id. A narrow interpretation of Title III focuses chiefly on physical barriers that would
prevent persons with physical disabilities from entering a physical structure (e.g., inaccessible
aisles or non-navigable stairs for persons in wheelchairs). According to Kotev, such a reading
would be “anomalous” because it “would narrow the application of Title III to bar
discrimination against only some of the categories of persons explicitly protected by the ADA,”
for physical barriers are no impediment to those merely perceived as disabled or for those who
are mentally disabled. Id. at 1321-22.
66. See, e.g., Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (analyzing examples of discriminatory actions
described in Title III); Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (same); Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322 (same).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
68. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
69. See Chabner, 994 F. Supp. at 1190 (“Finding that Title III applies only to physical
barriers to entry would render meaningless the provisions providing for equal access to goods
and services . . . . [and] sections dealing with modifications . . . would similarly be superfluous.”).
In addition, the court noted that a “safe harbor” provision of the ADA for insurers would also
be rendered meaningless if Title III did not ordinarily apply to insurance policies. See id.
70. See Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (noting that some ADA statutory language “would
be rendered irrelevant if Title III were held to apply only to physical access to public
accommodations”).
71. While the First Circuit stated merely that agency regulations weigh in favor of a
holding that places of public accommodation are not limited to actual physical structures, see
Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994),
other courts have used agency regulations as support for the further proposition that Title III
governs the content of insurance policies. See Winslow, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 427 (D.N.H. 1996).
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purposes and legislative history of the ADA, policy rationale, and the
demands of textual integrity in order to justify an expansive
construction of “place of public accommodation.” Not surprisingly,
other courts have used these exact criteria to justify a diametrically
opposite construction.
B. Decisions Narrowly Construing “Place of Public
Accommodation”
In 1997, a highly divided Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,72 which has since become
the leading case adopting a narrow construction of “place of public
accommodation.” The pivotal issue in Parker was whether an
employer-sponsored long-term disability plan was subject to the
discrimination prohibitions of Title III.73 The long-term disability plan
in Parker provided benefits until age sixty-five for individuals
suffering from physical disorders.74 For persons suffering from mental
or nervous disorders, however, the plan only provided benefits for up
to twenty-four months, unless the individual was hospitalized or
receiving inpatient care at the end of the twenty-four-month period.75
A plaintiff suffering from severe depression brought suit against
Metropolitan Life, the insurer through which her employer offered
the disability plan, when her benefits were terminated after twenty-
four months.76
The court began its analysis of the plaintiff’s Title III claim by
examining the statutory text, acknowledging the general
nondiscrimination provision in section 302(a) and the textual
examples of discrimination provided in section 302(b)(1)(A).77
Agreeing that section 301(7) expressly lists insurance offices as places
of public accommodation, the court noted that the plaintiff did not
72. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
73. See id. at 1008.
74. See id.
75. See id. Other courts ruling on similar facts have adopted Parker’s narrow construction
of “place of public accommodation.” See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that disability benefits provided to employees are not public
accommodations, and thus not covered by Title III); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Having no binding precedent to follow . . . we regard
the Sixth Circuit’s approach as the correct one.”). But see, e.g., Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982
F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (adopting a broader view of “place of public
accommodation” under similar facts).
76. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
77. See id. at 1010.
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seek a good or service of an insurance office but rather obtained a
benefit plan provided by her private employer that was issued by
Metropolitan Life.78 The court further stated that “[a] benefit plan
offered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public
accommodation . . . . [because under section 301(7)] a public
accommodation is a physical place.”79 Likewise, the court added that
the employer-sponsored long-term disability plan was not a good
offered by a place of public accommodation because the plaintiff
could not physically walk into the offices of Metropolitan Life and
obtain such plan.80
In adopting a narrow construction of “place of public
accommodation,” the Parker court relied on applicable DOJ
regulations. Previously, the Sixth Circuit had emphasized that the
prohibitions of Title III are limited to places of public
accommodation.81 Applicable DOJ regulations define “place of public
accommodation” as “a facility, operated by a private entity, whose
operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of” the twelve
categories listed in section 301(7).82 Regulations define “facility” as
“all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes,
equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks,
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property,
including the site where the building, property, structure, or
equipment is located.”83 All of these are physical structures or places.
In light of these regulatory definitions, the court stated that it would
contravene the plain meaning of Title III to hold that places of public
accommodation are not limited solely to physical places.84 It followed
then that because there is no nexus between an insurance policy
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1011.
81. See id. (citing Stoutenborough v. NFL, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995)).
82. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999)).
83. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104).
84. See id. (citing Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583); accord Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“The establishments enumerated in [section
301(7)] clearly show that a ‘place of public accommodation’ is a physical place . . . .”); Pappas v.
Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that places of public
accommodation, as defined in section 301(7), are all “‘places’ within the plain meaning of that
word”).
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offered by an employer and an insurance office building, Title III did
not apply to the policy.85
The court found further support for a narrow reading of “place
of public accommodation” in the DOJ regulations’ explanation of
Title III’s applicability to wholesale establishments.86 These
regulations state that wholesale establishments are covered “as places
of public accommodation except in cases where they sell exclusively
to other business and not individuals.”87 For example, if a food grower
supplies food to a food processing corporation on a wholesale basis, it
does not become a public accommodation subject to Title III’s
provisions, but if it operates a roadside stand selling crops directly to
the public, it is subject to Title III with respect to operation of that
roadside stand.88 Parker likened an insurance company to a wholesale
crop supplier, reasoning that because Metropolitan Life provided
insurance on a wholesale basis to an employer and not to individuals,
the insurance company’s policies were not subject to Title III; “no
place of public accommodation” was involved.89
Parker also directly criticized Carparts’s rationale for a broad
construction of “place of public accommodation” as contrary to
proper statutory construction.90 Carparts reasoned that places of
public accommodation, such as travel services, could not be limited to
actual physical places, since it would be absurd for persons procuring
services at an office to have the protections of Title III while those
who procured the same services by phone or mail did not.91 Parker
asserted that in reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit
85. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011; see also Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204,
206 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“While the physical structure of an ‘insurance office’ would be covered
under the Act, neither the insurance policy nor an insurance company is a ‘place of public
accommodation’ under the ADA because neither is a physical structure.”) (citation omitted).
86. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011-12.
87. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 623 (1999).
88. See id.
89. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011-12. The Parker court and others find further support in the
regulations for a narrow construction of “place of public accommodation.” These courts cite
DOJ regulations for the proposition that the ADA does not require entities to alter the mix or
nature of the goods that they offer to the public; it follows that the ADA cannot require
insurance companies to alter the nature of the insurance policies that they offer to the public.
See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998) (adopting the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Parker); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app.
B, at 630).
90. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1013-14.
91. See Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1994).
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“disregarded the statutory canon of construction, noscitur a sociis.”92
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis provides that the construction of
ambiguous terms should be informed by an analysis of accompanying
text “to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.”93 Parker reasoned that because most of the places of
public accommodation listed in section 301(7) are clearly physical
places (e.g., theaters, hotels, grocery stores), the ambiguity in terms
like “travel service” and “shoe repair service” should be resolved by
also limiting them to physical places.94 Parker blamed the ambiguous
terms on an unimaginative Congress that “simply had no better term
than ‘service’ to describe an office where travel agents provide travel
services and a place where shoes are repaired.”95 A broad
construction of “place of public accommodation,” therefore, would
violate the doctrine of noscitur a sociis and the text of the statute.96
Other courts, including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have
adopted both Parker’s analysis and its narrow construction of “place
of public accommodation.”97 In addition to the arguments set forth in
Parker, the Third Circuit noted that restricting “places of public
accommodation” to actual physical places is consistent with
jurisprudence pertaining to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,98
which prohibits other kinds of discrimination in places of public
accommodation.99 Although the breadth of “place of public
accommodation” under the Civil Rights Act has not been litigated
extensively, the Third Circuit noted that the few courts that have
spoken on the issue have adopted a narrow construction of the
term.100
92. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014.
93. Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (aligning itself
with the Sixth Circuit regarding the definition of “place of public accommodation”); Erwin v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Having no binding
precedent to follow, and having considered the parties’ arguments and reviewed both Parker
and Carparts, we regard the Sixth Circuit’s approach as the correct one.”); Pallozzi v. Allstate
Life Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 204, 206-07 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Parker in support of its
conclusion that the ADA does not pertain to the underwriting practices of insurance
companies).
98. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 613.
99. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
100. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 613 (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-75
(7th Cir. 1993); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (9th Cir. 1994)).
